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Abstract. The eradication of corruption in the private sector on the rule of law depends 
on two dimensions. The first element is repression, which emphasizes the imposition of 
criminal sanctions and the second is the preventive effort by fostering anti-corruption 
values in the organization. The general behavior of a person towards the rule of law is 
influenced by consideration of the incentives they may gain when they are law-abiding 
and the sanctions they may receive if they commit a crime or do not do what is required 
of them. This behavior also applies to corporations in making decisions relating to their 
obligation not to commit corruption. This paper analyses legal materials regarding the 
conditions under which corporate anti-corruption culture can provide legal implications 
in the commission of corruption within the corporation. This deploys normative juridical 
method that is in finding the data hold on juridical aspect by analyzing the legal materials 
with micro-comparative study and legislation approaches. This research is expected to 
provide input to corporations that by forming a corporate anti-corruption culture will 
bring legal implications that they may be able to obtain general defenses in criminal 
process of the corruption case if they have applied prudential principles in preventing 
corruption within the corporate environment reflected in the ethos, culture, and practices 
of the corporation. 
Keywords: corporate criminal liability, corporate culture, anti-corruption culture, general 
corporate defense. 
1   Introduction 
Corruption is undoubtedly a behavior that endangers society at large. According to a 
report by Ernst and Young [1], corruption causes unhealthy competition between business 
actors, reducing public confidence in government institutions and slowing economic 
development. Dimant and Eugen also argue that corruption can lead to political instability, 
ineffective administrative services, and poor governance structures [2]. According to a report 
by Transparency International (TI) agency in 2016, although Indonesia's corruption perception 
index has improved but still very high. Currently, Indonesia is number 90 from 176 countries 
with an index of 37 out of a maximum of 100. With widespread corruption behavior on all 
facet and lines, corruption eradication must also be conducted in all aspects. In addition to 
curative anti-corruption efforts, preventive effort to eradicate corruption is also very important 
to conduct. 
One of the potential perpetrators of corruption is a corporation. The corporation is part of 
social and economic actors that has a significant role in the life of wide community. 
According to legal theory, corporations have different legal personality with its members [3]. 
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They are independent legal subjects that can be the bearer of legal rights and/or obligations 
[4]. They may engage in legal relation, own property on its name, and as a consequence, they 
also may bear legal rights and duties for their deeds.  
In carrying out, its activities corporation may engage in various conducts that may be 
classified as a crime. One form of criminal conduct that can be committed by a corporation is 
corruption. In contrast to individual corruption activities that is aim to gain personal interest, 
the corruption of a corporation is carried out in a coordinated manner by some corporate 
members for the benefit of the corporation itself [5]. As Finney and Lesieur (1982) explain 
that one of the main criteria to differentiate between individual and corporation’s corruption is 
to determine actor who benefits from the conduct [6]. If the criminal act of corruption 
committed in favor of the corporation and or the owner or shareholder of the corporation, then 
the offense can be referred to as a criminal act committed by the corporation [7]. 
The fact that corporations could engage in corruption can be seen in some legal cases, for 
example, in the case of Siemens in 2008 in the United States, where Siemens was found guilty 
of corruption in many countries, using a special bank account to reduce the likelihood of being 
caught doing corruption [8]. Other major corruption case is Halliburton and Kellogg Brown & 
Root (KBR) in the United States in 2009, BAE System 2010 in the UK, Alcatel - Lucent SA 
in 2010, JGC Corporation in the United States in 2011, Rolls Roys in the UK in 2016, which 
also involves public officials in Indonesia, and others. In Indonesia, for example, is corruption 
case of PT. Giri Jaladhi Wana in 2011 in Banjarmasin. In addition, currently, the Corruption 
Eradication Commission (KPK) suspected PT Duta Graha Indah involved in corruption in the 
construction of Special Education Hospital for Infectious Diseases and Tourism Udayana 
University in the 2009-2010 Budget Year [9]. 
An important curative effort to eradicate corruption is to ensure that every actor of 
corruption should be held accountable for his actions, including the corporation as a legal 
subject. Criminal sanctions aim to ensure that the offender can rehabilitate themselves and 
others are also afraid to do the same act [10]. In this case, the purpose of punishment for 
corporations is that corporations who commit crimes can improve themselves and other 
corporations will be more careful in deciding to engage in a criminal act of corruption. 
Individual criminal liability is perceived as having an insufficient effect on corporate behavior 
because the existence and behavior of a corporation do not depend on one or two people in the 
corporation. In addition, by penalizing the corporation, the possibility of returning state assets 
will be greater than simply punishing one or two individuals within the corporation alone [11]. 
In addition to curative anti-corruption efforts, preventive efforts are also necessary. One 
form of prevention of corruption behavior by corporations is to establish a law-abiding and 
anti-corruption corporate culture. According to Judge et al. corruption is not only a matter of 
economics and law but is also a moral issue [12]. Morality affects and is influenced by socio-
cultural norms of society. So that every organization, whether political, legal or economic 
organizations are obliged to behave by ethical norms. It is imperative for any corporation to 
adopt a comprehensive compliance program to prevent its employees from committing a 
criminal act of corruption, in most cases paying bribes to public officials for the benefit of 
corporations [8]. 
Corporate culture is the values and views shared by the employees of a corporation, in 
which these values and views influence corporate decision-making whether the individual 
employee makes the decision or group of individual makes the decisions for the benefit of the 
corporation. Liu uses the term of corporate corruption culture to explain the conditions under 
which a corporation has a behavior that generally leads to opportunistic behavior [13]. Still 
 
 
 
 
according to Liu, the higher the level of corporate corruption culture, the higher the likelihood 
of the corporation performing a non-lawful act [13]. 
Based on the background mention above, this paper tries to analyze and find solutions to 
these research questions: a) what is the role of corporate culture to the corporation's corrupt 
behavior and b) are there legal implications in a criminal case when the corporation has 
implemented an anti-corruption culture? This research is important because a corporation can 
also own corrupt behavior. There has not been much discussion by legal experts to see how 
corporations also have an important role in spreading the extent of corruption in society. 
Moreover, the anti-corruption policy is still very focused on bureaucracy without involving the 
role of corporations who are also important actors in corrupt activities. This research is 
expected to provide input for corporations to be able to have an awareness of the importance 
of forming an anti-corruption work culture by not tolerating various forms of corruption 
within the corporation. 
In order to answer these research questions, this study deploys normative or doctrinal 
legal method, with micro-comparative and legislation approach.  
This paper will be divided into five sections. The first section will discuss the importance 
of corporations as the subject of the criminal law of corruption and the role of corporations in 
shaping anti-corruption culture. This chapter also explains the subject matter, objectives and 
expected benefits of this paper, and the methodology used in conducting the research — the 
second part analyses the corporate criminal responsibility doctrine. The next section will 
discuss the corporate culture that leads to corruption, and it will continue with comparisons of 
legislation and the application of corporate criminal liability in criminal acts of corruption in 
several countries. The fourth section will contain an examination about corporate compliance 
program as a criminal defense. The last section is conclusions and suggestions. 
2  Corporate Criminal Liability Doctrine 
When explored in depth about corporate criminal liability doctrine, generally can be 
divided into five doctrines: vicarious liability, identification, aggregation, corporate culture 
and combined doctrine [14]. Vervaele divides these doctrines into two approaches, first is an 
indirect liability, where organizations are always considered acting through its members. 
Therefore, it must be seeking individuals who are in specific position within the corporation, 
whether it is the directors, other executives or other members, and then their actus reus and 
mens rea attributed to the corporation.  Secondly is a direct liability, where actus reus and 
mens rea can be traced directly from the corporation. Direct liability approach is the 
development of realistic corporate personality theory [15]. Scholars who support realistic 
corporate personality, such as Lederman argues that corporations are self-identity that 
possessed all natural characteristics like a human [16]. If Vervaele’s opinion associated with 
corporate criminal doctrine mentioned above, vicarious liability and identification doctrine are 
an indirect liability, while aggregation and corporate culture doctrines are a direct liability.  
Vicarious criminal liability is a doctrine taken from the law of torts in civil law based on 
respondeat superior doctrine [17]. According to respondeat superior doctrine, a principal may 
be liable for its agent misconduct, if it is committed within their scope of employment [18]. 
The second doctrine is identification. Identification doctrine is the development of 
vicarious liability doctrine in corporate criminal liability [19]. This doctrine limits the doctrine 
of vicarious criminal liability that states that not everyone in the organization has sufficient 
 
 
 
 
status to cause corporations to be vicariously responsible for their crimes [20]. According to 
identification doctrine, corporations are identified through its key person or head of the 
corporations; these key persons are seen as legal alter ego of the corporations, so their actions 
are the actions of the corporation.  
Next is the aggregation doctrine. According to aggregation doctrine, a corporation can 
own intention or group intention, which can be traced from the aggregation of will and actions 
of some key persons within the corporation [11]. Pursuant to Remmelink as cited by Muladi 
and Priyatno, shared knowledge of the boards of directors can be considered as corporation’s 
knowledge [3]. Suprapto as also cited by Muladi and Priyatno asserts that corporation’s 
culpability is collective culpability of the corporation’s management [3]. Aggregation doctrine 
makes it easier to attribute criminal liability to the corporation because it eliminates the 
difficulty of identifying managerial culpability in large corporation [21]. 
The next doctrine is corporate culture or corporate disorganization doctrine. Pursuant to 
corporate culture doctrine, a corporation may own guilt by itself if the corporation’s culture or 
working ethos enables the commission of the crime [11]. Corporate’s cultures are transmitted 
from one generation to next generation unaffected by the change of personnel or members of 
the corporation [22]. It can be observed formally from corporate’s procedures and policies, or 
informally on how those cultures influence the action and behavior of an individual’s within 
the corporation [23]. 
The last is a combined doctrine proposed by Sjahdeini as an alternative to corporate 
criminal liability [18]. He explains ten elements to be fulfilled: the act is an offense, either an 
omission or commission; actus reus can be done or ordered by the directing mind or 
controlling mind of the corporation; mens rea is drawn from the directing mind’s mens rea; 
benefit the corporation, crime is committed by utilizing corporate’s existence, facility, or 
budget; the act is intra vires (within powers), carried out in the framework of the goal and 
purpose of the corporation; criminal act committed by directing the mind of the corporation is 
within his working scope and authority; if the actus reus is not carried out directly by the 
directing mind, the act shall be by order, or authorized, or approved by the directing mind, or 
consent shall be deemed to be granted if the directing mind does not prevent or prohibit the 
commission of the crime or fails to take adequate action when the offense occurred; there is no 
justification and excuse for the crime, actus reus, and mens rea do not have to be on one 
person but can be in some individuals within the corporation.  
3  Corporate Cultures That Lead to Criminal Conduct 
In general, experts view that there are two factors that cause corporations to commit 
corruption, especially in this case is paying a bribe. First, the view that states that corporations 
are rational profit maximizers. Corporations decide to pay bribes because the profit from the 
business is greater than the risk of being caught paying bribes or expected sanctions if the 
corporation gets caught [8]. The second view states that the corporation has made reasonable 
effort to fight corruption through the adoption of a compliance and ethics program, but one or 
several people from corporate employees still find ways to evade the system and pay bribes 
[24]. 
Corporate culture is a “web of attitudes and practices that tend to replicate and perpetuate 
itself.”[17]. Procedures and codes of ethics may also help define culture, as may supervision 
and discipline of employees. According to Harding, criminal liability may be imposed on a 
 
 
 
 
corporation if it has delinquent rationality, which may be attributable to corporate culture and 
processes of decision-making [25]. This corporate culture is either actively or passively 
permitting or tolerating non-compliance with legal provisions that lead to a crime [26]. So that 
criminal acts or violations committed cannot be seen as incidental or unexpected behavior 
from employees or members of the organization [16]. 
For example in the case of Enron, a culture of dishonesty, coupled with the wrong system 
of providing incentives, is exacerbated by the absence of good supervision, will allow group 
members to deceive shareholders and the wider community [27]. Alternatively, cases of 
injuries in the workplace are more often associated with overall management decisions about 
safety procedures and 'corporate culture,' which devalues employee safety standards, and are 
usually not caused by the carelessness of one company controller [28] — circumstances where 
the company may state that they care about the health and safety of their employees. However, 
the pressure given to individual employees is very high and unrealistic to be able to meet 
profit targets and time efficiency, so there is a possibility the company compromises the health 
and safety of its employees [26]. 
According to Yeager, corporate culture can be influenced by several factors including the 
personality of the company's leadership, the characteristics of the market where the company 
competes, and the vigilance and prudence of law enforcement officials [29]. 
Lederman asserts that in determining corporate criminal liability included in this category 
are also some of the following conditions: 1) a criminal act committed by a member of the 
corporation when a corporate procedure or policy may lead to the conduct of the act, 2) when 
the person who commits the crime is someone who is in an important position in corporate 
management, or when they instruct, encourage, or support the violation of the law, 3) when 
the corporation ratifies or gives explicit support for a violation committed by a member of the 
corporation (after committing a crime) [16]. 
De Maggie's opinion in explaining corporate criminal liability based on four 
examinations: 1) corporate policy, 2) corporate culture, 3) preventive faults, 4) reactive 
corporate faults [19]. Corporate policy in de Maglie’s models are similar to the first opinion of 
Lederman, the corporate culture model is elaborating on the second opinion from Lederman, 
and the third opinion is what is called De Maglie reactive corporate fault. Preventive faults 
according to de Maglie, are when corporations fail to implement an internal system that is 
adequate to prevent criminal acts. 
The corporate cultural doctrine is accepted in Australia and Switzerland in its Criminal 
Code. Section 12.3 of the Criminal Code Act of Australia explains that the element of error in 
the form of will, knowledge or negligence is attributed to the organization if explicitly, 
implicitly, secretly, authorizes or permits the occurrence of a criminal act.  
Article 102 (1) Criminal Code Swiss states that an organization is responsible for a 
criminal act committed within the objective scope of the organization and in the 
implementation of organizational activities that cannot be blamed on certain individuals but 
occur due to constipation from the organization (disorganization). 
Corporate criminal liability based on corporate culture is also accepted in the United 
Kingdom. From April 2008, the corporate culture may be an element of the offense of 
corporate manslaughter, where the way in which organizations' activities are managed and 
organized causes of death, and constitutes a gross breach of a relevant duty of care; and the 
way in which the organization's activities are managed or organized by its 'senior 
management' is a substantial element of the gross breach of the relevant duty of care [30]. 
Furthermore, this law also makes it possible to use corporate cultural doctrine in assessing 
whether a corporation can be held responsible for a crime. Section 8 (3) of this Act allows the 
 
 
 
 
jury to consider whether there is an attitude, policy, system, or practice that has been accepted 
by an organization that might encourage or tolerate criminal acts. 
It can be concluded that culture, work ethic, policies, work systems, or practices that have 
generally been accepted by the organization, lead or tolerate crime [31]. 
4  Corporate Compliance Program as a Defence 
 Not all perpetrators of criminal acts can be held responsible. Criminal law does not only 
require harmful conduct to blame but also requires the existence of malicious intentions. There 
are several reasons for the remission of mistakes — for example the doctrine of insanity, 
infancy, defense of force that goes beyond the limits as stipulated in Article 49 (2) of the 
Indonesian Criminal Code, and an invalid job order as regulated in Article 51 (2) of the 
Criminal Code and intoxication. Also, there are also other defenses that are outside the 
regulation. For example afwezigheid van alle schuld (avas) or there is no mistake at all [32]. 
According to Diening, avast can be paralleled with the defense of due diligence at 
common law, because both aim to show that there is no guilt in the subject [33]. For a 
corporation, the defense of no fault or due diligence defense is one of the reasons that judges 
often consider for not imposing criminal liability  [34]. 
For example, The United Kingdom Bribery Act of 2010 provides rules that reward 
compliance programs made by corporations. The Act provides that a corporation be strictly 
liable for a bribe committed by an employee, but it can use the defense of having adopted 
"adequate procedures" to prevent the bribe payment [35]. 
According to UK Ministry of Justice in its Bribery Act Guidance, the adequate-
procedures defense is included in the Bribery Act “to encourage commercial organizations to 
put procedures in place to prevent bribery by persons associated with them [36]. The guidance 
details six anti-bribery procedures: proportionality, top-level commitment, risk assessment, 
due diligence, communication and training, and monitoring and review.   
In the United States, the implementation of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines also promotes 
compliance program, which emphasizes rewarding a company for efforts to “promote an 
organizational culture that encourages ethical conduct and a commitment to compliance with 
the law.”[17] U.S Sentencing Guidelines also provides that an organization with pre-existing 
compliance policies and procedures will likely to face lower fine amount when resolving 
corporate bribery than an organization without pre-existing policies and procedures [37]. In 
addition, based on the US Department of Justice Charging Policy, corporations that already 
have compliance programs can avoid being indicted and instead receive a settlement 
agreement [38]. 
The focus of the corporate culture reform is not trying to change everything about a 
company’s culture, just its compliance with criminal law [17]. Real changes in corporate 
culture require sustained oversight of management, strong regulators, and sound rules and 
laws [17].  
5  Conclusion 
The Corporation should adopt a comprehensive compliance program to prevent its 
employees from paying bribes. The corporation must not think that anti-bribery culture is just 
 
 
 
 
as a legal compliance issue, but also as part of their social responsibility to society. From the 
government side must also provide incentives to corporations that have adopted and 
continually improve their compliance programs. However, it must be ensured that those who 
get rewards are corporations that implement effective compliance programs, not faulty 
compliance programs. That is a program that looks like it creates an attempt to prevent 
employees from paying bribes, but the company is not enforcing the program. The defense 
must be structured in a way that would encourage the corporation to implement a compliance 
program that is supported by ethical corporate culture. It is also important to make sure the 
defense can cause the corporation to improve their program regularly actively. 
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